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In seinen frühen Arbeiten setzt Herder regelmäßig die Proteusfigur ein, um die geschichtlichen Verwandlungen 
des Menschen und der Produkte des menschlichen Geistes zu schildern. Die Figur scheint zunächst in eine 
skeptische oder auch relativistische Richtung zu weisen (und wurde in Interpretationen von Herders Frühwerk 
oft so gedeutet). Eine textnahe Lektüre der Herderschen Verwendung der Figur und eine Analyse seiner 
Anknüpfungen an die Rezeptionsgeschichte des Proteus-Mythos ergeben aber ein anderes Bild. Sich auf 
Nebenbedeutungen der Proteusfigur wie die ‚Urmaterie‘ und die ‚Divination‘ stützend, verweist Herder gerade 
mit dieser Figur auf die Einheit in der Vielheit.  
In dieser Arbeit werden, nach einer kurzen historischen Darstellung der verschiedenen Deutungen der 
Proteusfigur, drei Methoden identifiziert und analysiert, die Herder anwendet, um anhand von Proteus die 
Einheit in der Vielheit einsichtig zu machen. Erstens geht es um den Versuch, anhand von Analogien die 
Verbindung aller historischen Gestalten der Menschheit aufzudecken. Zweitens wird erklärt, wie Herder durch 
die genetische Erklärung der Ursachen der historischen Verwandlung von menschlichen Sprachen und 
Kulturformen sich ihrer gegenwärtigen Form verstehend annähert. Drittens spielt Proteus eine wichtige Rolle in 
Herders Verständnis der Endlichkeit und Plastizität der menschlichen Natur sowie ihrer providentiellen Bildung 
durch die ganze Weltgeschichte hindurch. Gemeinsam ist den drei Strategien, dass Herder stets eine doppelte 
Polemik, sowohl gegen den Pyrrhonismus als auch gegen den Ethnozentrismus, führt. Die Hauptthese dieser 
Arbeit lautet, dass Proteus für Herder eine geeignete Denkfigur darstellt, um die Fehler beider Positionen zu 
vermeiden. Dabei ist es wichtig festzuhalten, dass nicht nur die Einheit und die Vielheit, sondern auch die 
anthropologischen und theologischen Aspekte von Herders Frühwerk auf diese Weise zusammengedacht werden 
können.  
 
I call upon Proteus, 
key-holding master of the sea, 
first-born, who showed 
the beginnings of all nature, 
changing matter 
into a great variety of forms. 
Honored by all, he is wise, 
and he knows what is now, 
what was before, 
and what will be in the future. 
He has all at his disposal, 
transformed far beyond 
all other immortals 
who dwell on snowy Olympos 
and fly through the air 
and over land and sea, 
for Physis was the first to place 
everything in Proteus. 
Orphic Hymns, 0-400 AD 
(Athanassakis, Wolkow 2013, 23) 
 
The highest spiritual beings were, from the very moment of creation, or soon thereafter, fixed 
in the mode of being which would be theirs through measureless eternities. But upon man, at 
                                                 
1 This work was supported by the European Research Council (Project: The Emergence of Relativism, Grant No: 
339382). 
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the moment of his creation, God bestowed seeds pregnant with all possibilities, the germs of 
every form of life. Whichever of these a man shall cultivate, the same will mature and bear 
fruit in him […] Who then will not look with awe upon this our chameleon, or who, at least, 
will look with greater admiration on any other being? This creature, man, whom Asclepius the 
Athenian, by reason of this very mutability, this nature capable of transforming itself, quite 
rightly said was symbolized in the mysteries by the figure of Proteus. 
Pico, Oration on the Dignity of Man (1487) (Pico 1956, 8-9) 
 
 
Proteus was a Homerian god of the sea who could prophecy about past and future to those 
who caught him, but who changed shape in order to escape from his pursuers. The idea of 
Protean shape-changing pulls strongly in two opposite directions: on the one hand, it can be 
used to read Johann Gottfried Herder’s early texts as a prototype of post-modern analyses that 
“question the very category of the ‘subject’ as the locus of representation” due to the 
inescapability of change and difference (Leventhal 1994, 165). On the other hand, the myth of 
Proteus presents a god whose identity is preserved despite the constant change of shape – the 
identity of a god who could be forced to use his power of prophecy. 
In this paper, I aim to show that Herder’s repeated invocations of Proteus in his early 
works (1765-1774) did not merely point in the first direction, but very much relied on a web 
of positive connotations drawn from Proteus’ illustrious nature. Undeniably, ‘Protean change’ 
fits well into the arsenal of concepts describing the ontological and/or anthropological state of 
Heraclitean flux, difference and historicity employed by philosophers like Foucault and 
Derrida. In scholarship on Johann Gottfried Herder’s historical thought, his references to the 
mythical figure of Proteus have mainly been interpreted as referring to this, or more 
specifically to the advent of historicism and the announcement of the problem of relativism.2 
My aim is to provide a more balanced understanding of the function of Proteus in Herder’s 
early philosophy of history in the following way. First, I provide the relevant historical 
context necessary to assess the significance and the different connotations of the myth. 
Second, and in order to distinguish the different shapes that Proteus takes on in Herder’s 
works, I trace Herder’s use of the metaphor of Proteus through his early writings. In my 
analysis, I identify three different manners in which Herder uses the positive identity 
underlying Proteus’ changes in order to reconcile the One and the Many, and I connect them 
to different aspects of the historical tradition.  
                                                 
2 I will discuss some of these accounts in more detail below. Herder’s references to Proteus are mentioned (but 
seldom discussed in any detail) here: Gjesdal 2017, 51-52; Noyes 2015, 32, 56; Sikka 2011, 38, 250; Beiser 
2011, 106-107; Irmscher 2009, 23-24; Herz 1996, 227; Leventhal 1994, 167; Norton 1991, 72, 80; Morton 1989, 
41; Heizmann 1981, 42; Meinecke 1946, 395. 
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The problem of this paper can be set out along the lines of two topoi of Herder’s early 
philosophy of history: on the one hand the doubting philosophers known as Pyrrhonists, and 
on the other the mythological figure of Proteus. According to Herder, the Pyrrhonists take 
plain historical phenomena to absurd conclusions that bring complete disillusionment 
regarding truth, beauty, and the good. Proteus, by contrast, exemplifies Herder’s own non-
skeptical manner of accommodating the mentioned historical phenomena: Proteus represents 
both the radical change and the absolute unity of humanity. My main theses will thus be that 
there is an identity underlying Proteus’ very different shapes and that it is because of his trust 
in this identity that Herder sees no merit in philosophical skepticism.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, I will introduce the tension that arises from 
Herder’s various criticisms of misguided universalisms on the one hand, and his anti-
skepticism on the other. I will show that for Herder, skepticism is a principally flawed mode 
of philosophizing that diverts the necessary analysis of our natural (and historical) certainties 
into a fruitless search for metaphysical demonstrations of particular doctrines. Second, a brief 
history of the antique and early modern uses of the Proteus figure will show that the proverb 
of Protean mutability traditionally had both very pejorative and pristine connotations, drawn 
from, for example, various myths and from alchemy. In the third section, I will examine 
Herder’s use of the metaphor of Proteus from his 1764 Essay on a History of Lyrical Poetry 
up till his 1774 treatise This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity. My 
analysis in this section is divided into three subsections that each single out a distinctive 
strategy for reconciling unity and diversity in Herder’s texts. This examination is meant to 
facilitate a discussion of those passages in Herder’s early works where he brings out the 
tension between the universal and the particular most forcefully and seeks to preclude its 
skeptical implications. 
 
 
I The Problem: Situatedness and Anti-skepticism 
 
Observations concerning historical diversity were already gathered by Herder in the 1766 
fragment On the Change of Taste. Traditionally, it was the Pyrrhonists who relied on these 
observations to raise philosophical problems, paradigmatically concerning the general 
possibility of truth and morality. In his text, Herder mentioned them by name: “Among the 
ancients, the Pyrrhonists and the Academic sect” and “[a]mong the moderns, La Mothe le 
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Vayer, Montaigne, and Hume” (Herder 2002, 248; FHA 1, 1513). The argumentative “modes” 
of Pyrrhonism, aimed at inducing “suspension of judgment”, included for example “one based 
on the differences among human beings”; “based on the differences in constitution of the 
sense organs”; “on the circumstances”; “on positions, distances and locations”; and “on ways 
of life, customs and laws, mythic beliefs and dogmatic opinions” (Sextus Empiricus 1996, 
94). Like the Pyrrhonists, Herder wanted philosophy to be guided by the insights of history 
(FHA 1, 159; Irmscher 2009, 41-42; Gaier 1988, 42-33). He thus relied on the same 
observations of diversity and change as they did in their argumentative modes against 
dogmatism. Nevertheless, Herder’s own intention from the beginning was to think through the 
implications of historical change without allowing skeptical conclusions. He emphasizes in 
his introduction: 
 
I do not believe that I am writing this page for doubters: so I shall let all the aforementioned men rest in peace. I 
merely want to gather historical examples of how far the diversity of human beings can extend, to bring it into 
categories, and then to try to explain it. (Herder 2002, 248-249; FHA 1, 151) 
 
Contrary to the Pyrrhonist mode of taking difference as signaling the need to suspend 
judgment, then, Herder interprets the diversity of phenomena as an invitation to collect, order 
and evaluate them all. 
Rather than being an issue of whether the skeptics can ultimately be refuted 
philosophically, Herder’s anti-skepticism was unequivocally moral and meta-philosophical.4 
Hence my interpretation is at odds with Sonia Sikka’s assessment that “while Herder 
occasionally expresses some concern about the possibility of an evaluative ‘skepticism’ that 
‘would almost confuse us into not trusting our own tastes and sensibilities,’ the real danger in 
his society is not such skepticism, but ethnocentrism. It is against this danger that his remarks 
are most often directed” (Sikka 2011, 27). Sikka is right in saying that Herder combated 
various intellectual and also ethical sins of his contemporaries that can be summarized under 
the label of ‘ethnocentrism’.5 And yet I will argue that Herder showed an equally strong anti-
skepticism.6 In this section, I first set out the tension between Herder’s anti-skepticism and his 
                                                 
3 References to English translations will be amended with a reference to the corresponding German editions. 
4 My approach is thus slightly different from interpretations of Herder’s philosophy of history venturing to assess 
whether certain arguments suffice to systematically refute the skeptic (e.g. Beiser 1987, 144; Beiser 2011, 139; 
Jacobs 1994, 65, 68). I focus on the meta-philosophical reasons Herder had to preclude skepticism as a viable 
way to do philosophy (cf. Kondylis 2002, 635; Spencer 2012, 104; Gjesdal 2017, 88-89). 
5 Note that ‘ethnocentrism’ here is a pejorative analysts’ concept. Furthermore, despite affirmation of this label 
by Richard Rorty, I take Sikka and others to be correct in their interpretation of Herder’s anti-ethnocentrism 
from the angle of anthropological theory (Sikka 2011, 42; Spencer 2012, 71, 101). 
6 In this paper I use ‘skepticism’ and ‘Pyrrhonism’ interchangeably and thus ignore the wide variety of (historical 
and contemporary) skeptical and Pyrrhonist positions. For the purposes of the historical reconstruction of 
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critique of ethnocentrism. Subsequently, I will argue in the rest of this paper that, in fact, 
Herder’s arguments were always directed against both ethnocentrism and skepticism and that 
this is because he considered the two to be closely related.7 
Basic aspects of the misguided attitude that would later be known as ethnocentrism are 
presented by Herder as follows: unaware of how far historical diversity actually extends, 
people tend to respond to differences in taste and manner of thought with disbelief and 
dismissal (FHA 1, 149-150). The mistaken belief that there are no real sensible alternatives 
leads them to think their own viewpoint is necessary and universal (ibid., 159). Yet 
unfortunately, “[t]wo looks at history dissolve this prejudice”, and show that actually people 
around the world have the same tendency to dismiss out of hand anything that is foreign to 
their own very diverse beliefs (Herder 2002, 255; FHA 1, 159). So Herder concludes, “thus do 
we see among nations and private individuals a contention of viewpoints which perplexes a 
wise man and makes him uncertain whether, then, all these fanatical people know what they 
are contending about” (ibid., 248; 150).  
The task of history, for Herder, is to battle the tendency to fanaticism through 
acknowledgment of the omnipresence of prejudice and intolerance and a better understanding 
of their respective mechanisms. Herder considers his own century to be in a special situation, 
since so much more information about distant nations and ages has becomes available than 
was before. But he finds that his contemporaries still lack a properly reflective attitude 
towards all these new discoveries inscribed in historical documents and travelogues (FHA 4, 
88-91; Gjesdal 2017, 166-168). A first step towards achieving this is identifying the precise 
point of contention between all different viewpoints. This point consists in the alleged 
universality and necessity of one’s own perspective. Herder suggests that the conflict of 
viewpoints can be resolved once people understand that they are contending about an 
allegedly exclusive universal validity of their own viewpoints that does not really exist in this 
form.  
Herder’s criticisms show there are different ways in which this error can be made. We 
might simply take our own manner of thought to represent the triad of the true, beautiful and 
good, or we take one that is actually foreign to us as universally representative and hence as 
ideal for us (the paradigmatic case for this was of course the treatment of the Greek in the 
                                                 
Herder’s anti-skepticism, I consider this permissible, because Herder brings them all together under the heading 
of ‘doubting’. 
7 My interpretation draws on Panajotis Kondylis’ correct assessment that it was precisely in order to remove 
skeptical doubt about the meaning of history that Herder criticized Enlightenment progressivism and 
ethnocentrism (Kondyllis 2002, 635). 
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Querelle).8 Or we might insist that the unchanging triad is the product of a purely 
philosophical demonstration, or of fundamental feelings, or that it has a divine origin.9 Or we 
assume that our national language represents a metaphysical ordering of concepts; or that our 
alphabet is a divine invention.10 Some of these assertions are generalizations from empirical 
data, while others look like a priori deductions. Herder’s point is, in fact, that all are empirical 
overgeneralizations made from our own historical standpoint. To uncover the error, Herder 
attempts to exhibit how manners of thought have, during their development, gone through a 
range of shapes (cf. Noyes 2015, 34; Gjesdal 2017, 89-91). 
At the same time, however, Herder aims to counter the skeptical conclusions which 
Pyrrhonist philosophers have drawn from the conflict and alteration of perspectives. 
Philosophically, these conclusions consist of the denial of universal norms for the true, 
beautiful, and good (FHA 1, 147). For Herder, such skeptical conclusions, qua philosophical 
theses, are as abstract and ineffective as their positive dogmatic counterparts. Skeptical 
Verzweiflung is a misguided attitude in dealing with the historical facts of cultural diversity 
(ibid., 19; FHA 4, 40). That is, Herder distinguishes between an observed situation, that of 
historical change, and the skeptic, who “tied all these scruples together into a knot which they 
have taken to be beyond untying” (Herder 2002, 248; FHA 1, 150). Herder does not intend to 
explain away the mentioned phenomena themselves, but neither does he take the tying and 
untying of Gordian knots to be the right task for philosophy. One year earlier, in How 
Philosophy Can Become More Universal and Useful for the Benefit of the People, Herder 
criticized that “philosophical reason […] ties knots in order to be able to untie them” (ibid., 
11; 113-114). And against the use of school logic in philosophy, Herder argued, “since our 
times no longer arm themselves with Sorites paradoxes and enthymemes […] it is just as 
fruitless a task to concern oneself with the tying and untying of such knots as it is to toss 
lentils through the eye of a needle” (ibid., 9; 111).  
Herder’s early works on metaphysics and aesthetics attest that he considered skeptical 
doubt to be the product of a false conception of what the human mind can achieve in 
                                                 
8 These two options are criticized by Herder in e.g. in On the Change of Taste and in the Older Critical Grove. 
9 Herder discusses these claims in How Philosophy Can Become More Universal and Useful for the Benefit of 
the People, and in the Fourth Grove, On Riedel’s Theory of the Beaux Arts, respectively. For the case of divine 
origins, Herder’s critique is concerned with human inventions like e.g. poetry and language, and with morality, 
but not with beauty and truth. (And also on these themes Herder switches back and forth throughout his career.) 
Cf. Essay on a History of Lyrical Poetry. I will return to this later; the general tension results from the fact that 
for Herder, we human beings, and the world, are of divine origin. 
10 Criticized in the first collection of Fragments, second edition, section seven, and the Treatise on the Origin of 
Language. 
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philosophy, and, specifically in metaphysics.11 Against the idea of an insulation of philosophy 
from everyday life, Herder claimed that while our natural certainties keep us on track, 
unrestrained curiosity and skepticism necessarily set us on an errant path (FHA 1, 11, 19). 
Just like psychology and ethics should not be the battlefields of the metaphysicians versus the 
skeptics, so should aesthetics steer clear from an all-or-nothing conception of beauty. Instead, 
aesthetics should collect, order and explain the products of the healthy human understanding 
(i.e. its judgments concerning taste), so as to improve its natural strength, and more generally, 
to educate the public via the study of man (cf. FHA 2, 270-271). In this way, aesthetics can be 
a vital contribution to the general anthropology that Herder urged philosophy to provide (FHA 
1, 134; cf. also 665). 
In his Essay on a History of Lyrical Poetry, Herder argues against the assumption that the 
poetic form of the Bible is of divine origin because after disproving this “the doubter could 
stray upon the errant path to assume that the content itself is the product of a passionate 
imagination” (HWP 1, 23; Herder 1992, 80). In this passage, the religious import of a 
doubting “auf den Irrweg geraten” is manifest: Herder’s anti-skepticism is directly connected 
to protecting individual souls, and society at large, from irreligion. Herder also depicts the 
skeptical result in very concrete terms: “Is, then, even what I take to be true true, since 
hundreds who have an equally good human understanding take it to be false? Is, then, even 
that beautiful which I imagine so? Can I trust myself?” (Herder 2002, 248; FHA 1, 151). In 
Herder’s psychology this trust that we have in our natural and sensuous certainties is of the 
uppermost importance to our lives, and should not be disrupted by philosophical doubt. 
What’s more, Herder’s defense of these certainties in many passages overlaps with 
explanations of the positive functions of prejudice – at least during certain periods in the past, 
and for certain uses, such as developing a national literature – and at some points even with 
direct defenses of prejudice. 
Herder’s anti-skepticism would culminate in This Too a Philosophy, where he diagnoses it 
as a cultural disease of the eighteenth century.12 Immanuel Kant’s famous nautical depiction 
in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as 
Science, of navigating the ship of philosophy away from David Hume’s sands of skepticism, 
is here prefigured: “Doubt in a hundred forms, but all with the dazzling title ‘based on the 
history of the world.’ Contradictions and ocean waves – one suffers shipwreck, or what of 
                                                 
11 Apart from How Philosophy, I am thinking here of the Essay on Being and the Fourth Grove in particular. 
12 Herder mentions by name Michel Montaigne, Pierre Bayle, Voltaire, David Hume and Denis Diderot (FHA 4, 
41).  
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morality and philosophy one saves from the shipwreck is hardly worth talking about” (Herder 
2002, 298; FHA 4, 41). Herder’s response to this situation was different from Kant’s: he did 
not take the threat of skepticism to necessitate a critique of reason in order to establish 
metaphysics as a science (like Kant did, for example cf. B22 in the Critique of Pure Reason 
Kant 1998, 147-148). Yet like Kant, he saw skepticism as arising out of a form of dogmatism, 
namely, out of the ethnocentric assumption that if certain values differ from ours, they are no 
values at all. Herder endeavored to explain genetically how skepticism arose as a cultural 
phenomenon out of expectations about philosophy that were both too high and unhistorical. 
But this does not yet address the problem raised in the introduction: how does Herder 
nonetheless positively identify the identity of Proteus, which underlies his different shapes? In 
the following, I intend to establish that Herder’s very conceptions of change and diversity are 
themselves decidedly anti-skeptical. 
 
 
II Shapes of Proteus 
 
The Proteus metaphor is only one among many analogies adopted by Herder to delineate the 
dynamics of nature and history.13 Yet its significance for the issue of unity and diversity has 
not yet been fully appreciated or analyzed.14 Herder adopts the metaphor in at least ten texts 
within the first ten years of his authorship.15 The figure consistently appears where Herder is 
most adamant about the radical nature of the effects of historical change. At the same time, I 
agree with Ulrich Gaier when he states in his commentary to the Frankfurt edition that Proteus 
represents the changes of a “substantially identical object”, and that it is because of the 
postulated substantial identity of Proteus that Herder could block skepticism (FHA 1, 1002). I 
will briefly discuss the main motifs attached to the figure of Proteus that are of importance 
                                                 
13 Herder’s use of tropes has been studied extensively (e.g., cf. recently Allert 2016; Simon 2014). A classic 
analysis was undertaken by Irmscher (1981); metaphorical organicism was studied by Schick (1971); an 
overview of metaphors used by Herder can be found in Albus (2001, 288-399). 
14 Albus (2001, 374-375) merely lists the different phenomena which Herder called a Proteus; Irmscher (2009, 
23-24) does not integrate Herder’s use of the metaphor in his systematic interpretation; a range of interpretations 
(cf. note 1 above) exclusively connects Proteus to radical change.  
15 Namely: On Dilligence in the Study of Several Learned Languages, How Philosophy Can Become More 
Universal and Useful for the Benefit of the People, Fragment of a Treatise on the Ode, On the Change of Taste, 
the second edition of the First Collection of Fragments on Recent German Literature, Critical Forests: Second, 
Third, and Fourth Grove, Treatise on the Origin of Language, and This Too a Philosophy. Surprisingly, the 
indexes of the complete edition of Herder’s letters (section “Mythology”) as well as of the Herder Handbuch do 
not mention Proteus.  
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here, and suggest how they inform Herder’s use of the metaphor. Subsequently, I will assess 
the different ways in which Herder incorporates Proteus in his philosophy of history.  
Proteus was a Greek sea-god who appeared in the writings of Homer, Virgil, Euripides, 
and Ovid. Two important qualities of Proteus are metamorphosis and divination: “He […] 
possessed the gift of prophecy, but was unwilling to disclose what he knew and tried to escape 
questioners by assuming a variety of shapes, including fire and water and the forms of wild 
beasts” (Grant 2001, 450-451). Although he was unwilling to use his power of prophecy to 
help human beings, Proteus was not evil, nor completely unreachable: he could be forced to 
help, if tricked in the right way. Furthermore, his shape-shifting only started in response to 
being approached by human beings who had already recognized him as the sea-god he really 
was. Menelaus was able to capture him in his sleep after disguising himself as a seal; 
Aristaeus caught him at noontide (ibid.). This is a Greek manner of relating to the gods, which 
Herder would not want unreflectively applied in modern times. Still, as a Homeric metaphor, 
Proteus has the characteristic of being within reach, despite his shape-changing, as long as he 
is approached in the right way; and of being able to divine to us the past and the future. 
A less positive portrayal of Proteus appeared in Plato’s writings, as a characterization of 
the sophists in Euthydemus for example. In accordance with the Homeric narrative, it was 
Socrates’ job to bind the Protean sophists and put an end to their deceitful shape-shifting. Yet 
contrary to the fortune-telling of Homer’s Proteus, in Plato’s representation the end result was 
merely negative: “Proteus was an appropriate opponent for the seeker of knowledge because 
his very nature was opposed to truth” (Burns 2001, 971). Likewise, Socrates accuses the 
rhapsodist Ion: “You literally assume as many forms as Proteus, twisting and turning up and 
down, until at last you slip away from me” (Plato 1925, 542; cited in Giamatti 1968, 463). 
In the reception of this ancient myth from the Renaissance onwards – in discourses on art, 
science and religion – the following three figures are of central significance. The first was 
Pico della Mirandola’s use of Proteus for his humanistic thesis that “upon man, at the moment 
of his creation, God bestowed seeds pregnant with all possibilities, the germs of every form of 
life. Whichever of these a man shall cultivate, the same will mature and bear fruit in him” 
(Pico 1956, 8). Here, Pico used the figure of Proteus to symbolize the mutability that 
humanity acquired thanks to its position in the center of creation. Furthermore, Pico’s 
syncretic approach to the history of philosophy expressed how humanity should find the One 
in and through the Many (Giamatti 1968, 440). However, it was crucial for Pico that man’s 
power of self-transformation was not meant to be used for the sake of shape-shifting itself. 
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Rather, it was the task of humanity to use its freedom to choose the highest form of life (and 
not assume in the great chain of being the position of a plant or an animal). 
In a second figure, early modern literary critics and theologians protested against the 
power of transformation precisely because it violated the stable and lawful order of things. 
According to a metaphysical conception of life on earth as stably ordered in a chain of being, 
Protean change was considered (sinfully) transgressive (Zámbóné Kocic 2011, 49-50; Burns 
2001, 977-978). Furthermore, as a characterization of human behavior, ‘Protean’ and 
‘Proteus’ were used to refer to deceit, hypocrisy, and to an unlawful stepping out of one’s 
(societal, moral) role – to plagiarism, as well as to perversions of the passions, even rape 
(Zámbóné Kocic 2011, 53-58; Giamatti 1968, 460, 467). 
The third strand of figures turns the negative connotations of Proteus’ mutability back into 
their opposite. It was derived from alchemy and natural science, where Proteus stood for the 
‘first matter’ of nature (Zámbóné Kocic 2011, 59-61). This matter was denominated first 
matter precisely because of its variety of appearances; for remaining the same in all 
differences. Francis Bacon used this understanding of Proteus to argue for the necessity of 
scientific experiment – the willful manipulation of nature – to decipher nature’s secrets 
(Burns 2001, 973-974). And John Milton referred to Proteus as first matter in Paradise Lost 
to describe the sun: “That stone, or like to that which here below/ Philosophers in vain so long 
have sought,/ In vain, though by their powerful art they bind/ Volatile Hermes, and call up 
unbound/ In various shapes old Proteus from the sea,/ Drained through a limbeck to his native 
form” (Milton 2005, 96). This passage suggested that Proteus’ ‘native form’ is conserved in 
his different shapes, in the sense of being “[n]ot all parts like, but all alike informed/ With 
radiant light” (ibid.). The chemical process of draining through a limbeck (a device for 
distilling) was aimed to retrieve this original form. Zámbóné Kocic suggests in her 
dissertation Protean Vicissitude and Milton’s Paradise Lost that this passage from Milton can 
be connected to Pico’s “neoplatonic sentiment” according to which the variety of Proteus’ 
shapes must be engaged exhaustively in order to learn about its essence. That is, another 
Greek god must be invoked here: “Pan representing the sum of all (‘pan’ being the Greek 
word for ‘all’), and Proteus, bound and vexed to extremes unfolding the many ‘passages and 
variations of nature’ (Bacon 1854, 189), are linked in this tradition as embodiments of the 
unity and multiplicity of nature respectively” (Zámbóné Kocic 2011, 61; cf. Burns 2001, 972). 
In this way, the discussion of Proteus indirectly points to the metaphysical theme that became 
so important for Herder especially after Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi had criticized Gotthold 
Ephraim Lessing’s alleged Spinozism: hen kai pan (FHA 5, 282-294). Furthermore, the myth 
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leaves open conceptually whether it is Pan who “transforms himself into a Proteus” in a top-
down manner, or Proteus who through his mutations approximates the totality of possible 
shapes.16 
Finally, it was suggested in seventeenth-century natural philosophy that Proteus’ shape-
shifting “paralleled the natural philosopher’s ability to imagine himself in the situation of 
different natural substances and phenomena” (Burns 2001, 976). This idea would later prove 
very fruitful for historicist conceptions of historical understanding: as a metaphor for 
humanity, Proteus may in the end represent both the object of enquiry – distant and diverse 
human forms – as well as the knower, who feels her way into historical realities.17  
Johann Georg Hamann had (as always) all the exciting references to start off a spirited 
appropriation of the myth of Proteus in German Enlightenment debates: in his 1761 Clouds, 
he defended his Socratic Memorabilia against a review by presenting himself as Proteus, 
hunted down by his reviewer (Hamann 1950, 107). Hamann (in some copies of this work 
intended for friends) added references to the Odyssey, to Plato’s Euthydemus and Ion, as well 
as to an ancient version of Proteus as first matter in the so-called Orphic Hymns (Rudolph 
2008, 409-411). The result is highly elusive, yet two aspects stand out. First, Hamann 
considered Protean shape-shifting a necessary aspect of his authorship, and he certainly 
connected this to the topoi of Proteus as a poet and a seer in his own influential conception of 
the genius.18 Second, Hamann integrated the figure of Proteus (as well as of Socrates) into a 
Christology, according to which all of nature and history (including all world literature) can 
be read as prophetic signs of divine revelation. For Hamann, Proteus is an emblem of God’s 
capacity to show Himself in creation in various shapes – and one transformation of course 
stands out: His Menschwerdung.19 It is no accident that Proteus appears again in a quote from 
Horace one year later, at the climax of the Aesthetica in Nuce, in a series of apocalyptic 
indications of (an ancient version of) the myth of the Flood (Hamann 1950, 216). 
                                                 
16 The quote is from the Welsh seventeenth-century alchemist Thomas Vaughan (quoted in Burns 2001, 972). 
Pico is quoted in the same context as having a very explicit opinion on the matter: “He who cannot attract Pan 
approaches Proteus in vain”. 
17 Cf. Gjesdal (2017, 114-115) on the connection between the methods of divination and sympathy in Herder’s 
hermeneutics. I will expound on this below, yet it may already be noted that Herder used the Latin loanword 
“Divination” in 1768 and 1778 to denote a special kind of feeling and “living reading” (FHA 2, 605; FHA 4, 
366). 
18 Rudolph has some difficulty in his interpretation to explain how Hamann appropriated the Plato passages in a 
positive way. Proteus’ capacity of divination (which Rudolph does not explicitly address) makes this a bit easier 
(Rudolph 2008, 409-410; cf. Giamatti 1968, 445-450). 
19 In his Faust Johann Wolfgang Goethe would let the homunculus be sent to Proteus in order to give this mere 
spirit a human form. I will return to this below. 
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It is impossible to precisely identify the sources on which Herder relied for his 
understanding of the Proteus myth. Apart from the aforementioned classical ancient sources, 
which he undoubtedly knew by heart, in 1764 Herder had discussed the character of the 
Orphic Hymns (HWP 1, 32, 38), and had praised Orpheus in 1774 as the genius poet in which 
“the whole spirit of nature lives” (FHA 3, 63, my translation). Furthermore, in 1763 and 1769 
Herder had also written notes on Bacon’s The Advancement of Learning (Irmscher, Adler 
1979, 197). He had also taken notes from Plato’s Euthydemos, where Socrates goes after the 
Protean sophists.20 In addition, Milton’s Paradise Lost was an exemplar for Herder from his 
first Königsberg commentary on Hamann’s Aesthetica in Nuce onwards (FHA 1, 34, 240, 
284, 295). Finally, William Shakespeare’s Two Gentlemen of Verona and Alexander Pope’s 
The Dunciad may have given examples to Herder of treacherous Proteus figures, who 
transgressed the natural and/or moral order and misused language to cause confusion 
(Giamatti 1968, 459-460, 472-474).21 
In Herder’s own use of the figure, however, a notion is added that (as far as I have been 
able to determine) was never part of any version of the Proteus myth: a ‘Zauberspiegel’. The 
ancient Hellenistic and Judaistic ritual usage of such a mirror, known as ‘catoptromancy’, was 
carried out for the purpose of divination (Herz 1996, 18). In Herder’s writings, it is either us 
who attempt to divine Proteus in his different shapes via this magic mirror, or it is Proteus 
himself who relies on it to take on different shapes. That is, Proteus either appears in 
constantly changing shapes by way of a mirror, or the mirror is used to catch the identity of 
Proteus that underlies these different shapes.  
The history of the metaphor of mirroring (and of the image and the faculty of reflection) is 
far too rich and complicated to recount here. Hopefully it suffices to recall key motifs like the 
imago Dei doctrine, Plato’s distinction between ideas and the phenomena reflecting them, and 
Leibniz’ idea that the monad reflects all of the universe from its particular perspective.22 The 
latter idea was particularly pregnant for Herder because it depicted the human soul as an 
individual living mirror – full of particular minute perceptions and simultaneously reflecting 
                                                 
20 They are from a notebook with other notes from 1769, although the Plato editions in the Bibliotheca 
Herderiana are all from the 1780’s (Irmscher, Adler 1979, 201; Bibliotheca Herderiana 1979, 1666-1673, 1677, 
1685, 1697). 
21 In a passage of less significance for my over-all interpretation, Herder questions Christian Adolf Klotz’ 
integrity by claiming that “like a Proteus, he speaks in more than one tongue and language” (Herder 1990, 2 / 1, 
444, my translation). 
22 Cf. Herz (1996, 13-19, 23-33) for a well-informed discussion of these and various other motifs relevant for 
interpreting Herder. Cf. also Konersmann (1991, 75-173) for a more comprehensive history in which Herder 
plays an important role in the formation of modern subjectivity. Again Rorty has a different narrative I cannot 
confront here, of the epistemological use of the mirror metaphor, but cf. Herz (1996, 22-23, 41) for helpful 
suggestions.  
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all. Notably, Leibniz’ monadology was an effort to combine the greatest unity with the 
greatest diversity; a reconciliation of Pan and Proteus, so to speak. Relying on the imago Dei 
doctrine, one could subsequently make the inference that just like one God mirrors Himself in 
all of creation, so does Proteus (humanity) have the ability to mirror itself in different places 
and times (cf. Konersmann 1991, 148-154).23  
Incidentally, mirroring is a distinctive trait of human nature both in Herder’s 
anthropological and in his theological writings. First, Herder’s 1769 interpretation of Genesis 
1, day six, makes it clear that according to a primordial act of mirroring, man was created in 
God’s image (FHA 5, 61; Bellmann 2016, 52-54). Second, (and contrary to traditionally 
stronger interpretations of the Fall), the Treatise on the Origin of Language places humanity’s 
creative capacity of reflection in the center in the following way: the human being “becomes 
free-standing, can seek for himself a sphere for self-mirroring, can mirror himself within 
himself. No longer an infallible machine in the hands of nature, he becomes his own end and 
goal of refinement” (Herder 2002, 82; FHA 1, 717). Thus Herder’s conception of humanity 
combines Protean shape-shifting with mirroring. In compensation for their lack of animal 
instinct, human beings have the power and freedom to give their own existence a specific 
shape. The ultimate purpose of humanity is self-refinement through recognizing oneself in a 
“Sphäre der Bespiegelung”, a “sich in sich bespiegeln” (ibid.). As a result, the figure of 
Proteus may, in natural as well as historical enquiry, refer both to the knowing subject and to 
the object of investigation. And in the case of historical understanding of human practices, 
this yields a crucial insight: any hermeneutic engagement with historical others is in fact a 
practice of self-mirroring of human beings in different shapes. 
Finally, in contrast to Hamann, and like Pico, Herder’s Proteus marks the condition of 
finitude, and of all things human. The notion of the mirror, too, expresses a theological 
conception of finitude: finite human beings are never capable of reaching behind reflections 
and appearances into the essential nature of things. Proteus reflects, in every single shape he 
takes on, humanity, be it always from a different and particular standpoint. Very much like 
Pico, then, Herder adopts the metaphor to express the openness of man to many possibilities. 
The shape-shifting of Proteus represents the historical change of a single human species.  
 
 
                                                 
23 Goethe’s Werther would write in his fourth letter how human and divine mirroring should mutually reflect 
each other in the apprehension of sublime nature: “could you breathe onto the paper what lives so fully, so 
warmly within you, so that it would become the mirror of your soul, as your soul is the mirror of the infinite 
God!” (Goethe 1774, 9-10, my translation; also cf. Konersmann 1991, 116-121, 152). 
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III Herder’s Metaphysics of Proteus  
 
In this section, I will outline how Proteus could, in Herder’s early work, refer to both radical 
change and continuity. Subsequently, I will, in three subsections, identify three different 
reconciliatory strategies which Herder adopted in order to provide world history with a stable 
subject in the guise of (malleable) humanity. The first two strategies can be found in Herder’s 
works written before he moved to Bückeburg (1771); the third is most forcefully expressed in 
his 1774 This Too a Philosophy.  
Concerning Herder’s earliest works (1764-1766), commentators Gaier and Wolfgang 
Pross notice a tension and then a shift, from an “Enlightenment universalist science of man” 
to a more “historically differentiated approach” (FHA 1, 929; HWP 1, 694-695). This tension 
was certainly there – but nowhere did Herder fully give up on a universalist science of man. 
Rather than identifying a specific moment when Herder was forced to appreciate the absolute 
individuality of historical particulars, then, I find it more useful to make explicit the different 
strategies adopted by Herder to face the “problem of the relation between anthropological 
uniformities and historical change” (Irmscher 2009, 149; cf. also Norton 1991, 165, 172). In 
this context the image of Proteus appears as an instrument, used to reconcile a universalist 
anthropology with the full recognition of historical change, and shows that precisely because 
Herder never gave up on the first, he was able to fully appreciate the second. By consequence, 
I interpret the function of Proteus in Herder’s texts as both anti-skeptical and anti-
ethnocentric. 
Recall the problem I set out on the basis of On the Change of Taste, the problem of how to 
productively face the fact of historical change without allowing the Pyrrhonist modes of 
argumentation to induce skeptical conclusions. Herder’s question is how we can do full 
justice to the fact that we are historically situated, and still hold on to some metahistorical 
stability. To encapsulate the philosophical “knot” which the Pyrrhonists presented as beyond 
untying, Herder refers to the classic triad as a true Proteus:  
 
As soon as it is shown that what I, based on reasons, consider to be true, beautiful, good, pleasant can likewise 
on the basis of reasons be regarded by another as false, ugly, bad, unpleasant, then truth, beauty, and moral value 
is a phantom that appears to each person in a different way, in a different shape: a true Proteus who by means of 
a magic mirror ever changes, and never shows himself as the same. (Herder 2002, 247, translation modified; 
FHA 1, 149) 
 
Apart from the issue of ethnocentrism discussed above, Herder examines how a range of 
factors, like time, clime, physiological constitution, custom and tradition, cause diversity in 
taste and manner of thought (FHA 1, 152-156). Herder concludes: “Time has changed 
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everything so much that one often needs a magic mirror in order to recognize the same 
creature beneath such diverse forms” (Herder 2002, 255; FHA 1, 159). This passage perhaps 
pulls most strongly into the direction of a use of the metaphor which expresses the extreme 
difficulty, if not impossibility, of still recognizing some similarity between historical forms. If 
Proteus never shows himself as the same, he is more like the deceitful sophists, who hide their 
untruthfulness by constantly changing shape. But recall that unlike the Pyrrhonists, Herder 
aims in this text to show “how in the valley and on the plain creatures stray about that are so 
diverse that they hardly have a common name left; however, they are our fellow brothers, and 
their history is the history of our nature” (ibid., 249; 150). In my interpretation, the magic 
mirror refers not merely to the difficulty, but also the possibility of recognizing that common 
names to describe the human nature of our fellow brothers do exist (cf. Irmscher 2009, 23; 
Beiser 2011, 107). This might sound far-fetched as an interpretation of the passage quoted 
above. In the following, I hope to make this hypothesis appear more plausible. Herder’s other 
very early invocation of Proteus gives a first indication of how this might be done. 
In Herder’s 1765 On Dilligence in the Study of Several Learned Languages, it is language 
which is Protean. The historical adaptation of languages on different continents is the reason 
for Herder to state about language: “So this plant transformed itself according to the soil that 
nourished it and heaven’s breeze, that quenched its thirst: it became a Proteus among nations” 
(Herder 1992, 30; FHA 1, 23). Michael Morton has already pointed out in his close-reading of 
this text the extra connotation in addition to Proteus’ mutability: since Herder will describe in 
the essay the proper relationship towards foreign languages as one of appropriation and 
adaptation of other languages to the condition of our mother tongue, it is suggested we hold 
on to this Proteus through its various transformations, and bind him, so that he may divine to 
us the distinctive riches of different languages (Morton 1989, 41). Moreover, the 
identification of language with a plant suggests an organic continuity between different 
environments which underlies Herder’s claim in the essay “I transplant myself into it […] 
expand my soul into every clime” as well as the idea that we need our native language as a 
guiding thread through the labyrinth of languages (Herder 1992, 32-33; FHA 1, 26-28). It 
provides fertile soil for transplantation, and suggests (rather than argues) that translation of 
foreign concepts into our native language can be productive. I now start with the first 
reconciliatory strategy which Herder built on this continuity.  
 
 
III.1 Protean Universals 
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In the Fragments of a Treatise on the Ode Proteus appears under the heading “On the 
metempsychosis of the ode with respect to sensation”. Here as before, Herder’s starting-point 
is the historical diversity between different nations, which arises not just in the area of custom 
or second nature, but also, before that, physiologically and unconsciously (FHA 1, 79-83, 
152-155). He depicts the effects for the range of products of the human mind that he calls 
“ode” as follows: 
 
If any genre of poetic art has become a Proteus among nations, judged on the basis of sensibility, subject matter, 
and language, the ode has so altered its spirit and content and expression and pace, that perhaps only the 
aesthetician’s magic mirror will recognize the same living essence [dasselbe Lebendige] in so many shapes. 
Nevertheless, there still is a certain general unity of sensibility, of expression, and of harmony, which makes it 
possible to draw a parallel among them all. (Herder 1992, 36-37, translation modified; FHA 1, 79) 
 
Herder aimed to revise and complete the Baumgartian project of aesthetics as a science of the 
human soul. In Herder’s view, this science was meant to empirically and historically collect 
all the different instances of human cognition and artistic production. Furthermore, the 
science of aesthetics must explain their genesis out of a sensuous core of human feeling – out 
of what Alexander Baumgarten had called the “fundus animae” or “Grund der Seele” 
(Baumgarten 2011, 270-271).24 In this way, it is “der Ästhetiker” who has to place all the 
different poetic arts from different nations and times in front of a magic mirror, in order to 
still recognize the unity of sensibility, of expression, and of harmony between different works, 
and be able to discuss them historically under the general heading of ‘ode’ (Gjesdal 2017, 51-
52). Clearly, the Protean metempsychosis25 of the ode expresses the difficulty of tracing the 
unity of sensibility. Nonetheless, these notions, “dasselbe Lebendige” and “ein gewisses 
allgemeines Eins der Empfindung, des Ausdrucks und der Harmonie” are of crucial 
importance as preconditions for finding analogies (cf. Norton 1991, 72-73). By explaining 
their functions, I will now demarcate the first of Herder’s strategies to reconcile unity and 
difference. I shall argue that these unifying notions – or Protean universals – indeed infuse 
the aesthetician’s Zauberspiegel with systematic significance. This is because they allow us to 
see how wide varieties of individuals stand in complex relations of mirroring each other, and 
how they together compose a general “Analogie der Natur” as well as an “Analogie aller 
menschlichen Seelenkräfte” (FHA 1, 715, 743). 
                                                 
24 For compelling interpretations of Herder’s psychology and aesthetics cf. Noyes 2015; Adler 1990; Norton 
1991; and Menke 2017.  
25 The Greek term for the transmigration of the soul – itself a significant phrasing due to the connotation of 
infinite subsistence of the object undergoing change.  
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In Herder’s philosophy of history, the allgemeines Eins der Empfindung was drawn from 
a basic human sensuousness which was most present in the early stages of history, yet could 
be regenerated (or mirrored) via various cyclical historical developments.26 On this basis of 
human psychology Herder grounded a process of analogical understanding (cf. Irmscher 
1981). This becomes clear from the works written shortly after the work on the ode, such as 
the Fragments on Recent German Literature and the Older Critical Grove: by finding 
analogies between different cultural forms, Herder intends to point at transfer and 
appropriation, and eventually at a “Kette der Mitteilung” between all the life-stages of 
humanity (FHA 2, 25, 32, 39). For Herder this results in ways to legitimately order the whole 
of world history, for example with reference to the sequence of ages of poetry, prose, and of 
science, and to a development from sensuous beginnings towards an increasingly more 
rationality and complexity. Interpreted charitably, this lawfulness of history may be seen to be 
generalized from historical particulars and the similarities between them (HWP 1, 16; cf. 
Norton 1991, 74; FHA 1, 996). Yet however this may be, it is Proteus’ living essence which 
safeguards the possibility of finding similarities. If we move a few years ahead, from the Riga 
works to Strasbourg at the end of 1769, the reason for this may become apparent. 
In the Treatise on the Origin Herder argues from analogies between Proteus’ different 
forms to a chain which links different peoples together in a progressive whole. In the 
treatise’s second part, Herder distinguishes four “main laws of the human being’s nature and 
of his species” under which he collects the factors which explain how humanity has been able 
to autonomously invent language, and how language had to develop historically (Herder 
2002, 127; FHA 1, 769). While the first two laws discuss features of human nature that 
promote the invention and development of language in general, the third law explains how a 
diversity of national languages had to arise. This law centers on those aspects of human group 
behavior which explain why a continuous unity of language was principally impossible (cf. 
ibid., 791-799). Central factors discussed by Herder are adaptation to different natural 
environments, the importance of language to community-forming, and the competition and 
conflict between different communities (cf. Piirimäe 2015; Spencer 2012, 73-84, 146). 
Proteus is used to put the problem – recall: situatedness, and the imperative to preclude 
skepticism – in the following way:  
 
“Human beings should live everywhere on the earth, while each animal species merely has its land and its 
narrower sphere”; the earth-dweller becomes apparent. And if this is so, his language becomes language of the 
                                                 
26 Examples of such cycles and regenerations of origins would be the analogies between the childhood of 
humanity, of nations and of individual human beings, and between the Morgenröthe of the world and of each 
day (cf. also Heizmann 1981; and Gaier 1988, 35-40, 49-50).  
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earth as well. A new language in every new world, national language in every nation – I cannot repeat all the 
aforementioned determining causes of the change – language becomes a Proteus on the round surface of the 
earth. Some recent fashionable philosophers have been so unable to bind this Proteus and see him in his true 
form that it has seemed to them more probable that nature was as well able to create for each large region of the 
earth a pair of human beings to found tribes as it was to create special animals for each clime. (Herder 2002, 150, 
translation modified; FHA 1, 794) 
 
Herder accuses the “Modephilosophen” of letting go of Proteus, and allowing him to keep 
changing shape. This leads these philosophers to polygenism concerning the human species 
and its language ability: they use observations about the radical differences of languages, even 
within the same geographical region, to draw the conclusion that there actually is no similarity 
whatsoever between different languages, and that different human races do not have a 
common origin: “here, these doubters conclude, all human investigation comes to an end” 
(ibid., 151; 795). In contrast to this Pyrrhonist argumentation, Herder aims to show Proteus’ 
true form: “because these people merely doubt, I want to attempt to show that the 
investigation does not come to an end here, but that this ‘difference [between peoples] right 
next to each other can be explained just as naturally as the unity of the familial language in 
one nation’” (ibid.). In its true form, language can be seen to have been originally shared by 
all of the human “Erdbewohnern”, despite its Protean change later on. And ultimately, the 
fourth law states, the human species at large can be recognized as “a single progressive whole 
with a single origin in a single great household economy, likewise all languages too, and with 
them the whole chain of civilization [Bildung]” (ibid., 154; 799). 
To explain the disproportionate level of difference between nations that, geographically, 
are very close to one another Herder points towards the phenomenon of what he calls 
“reciprocal familial and national hatred” (ibid., 151; 796). In short, Herder relies on this 
phenomenon to interpret diversity as a product of conflict, and conflict as arising from the 
factor that nations take each other seriously as competitors. Thus the same ethnocentric 
attitude problematized by Herder in many of his earlier texts he now adopts for explaining 
general historical developments (cf. Irmscher 2009, 204). This explanation presupposes that 
originally all nations were in contact with each other, and became separated only later, 
through conflict. How Herder affirms the kernel of truth to the myth of Babel (“only as a 
poetic fragment for the archaeology of the history of peoples”) attests to the idea that world 
history must be understood as a continuous development of transfer and conflict (Herder 
2002, 153; FHA 1, 798). This presupposition is, in turn, based on an empirical generalization 
that relies in its turn on the Analogie aller menschlichen Seelenkräfte in the following way.  
Defending the fourth law of human nature, the issue between Herder and the skeptic 
regarding monogenism is whether the chain of cultural transfer, which can be observed within 
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individual nations, can be extended to the species at large. That is, the question is whether the 
sequence of Proteus’ different shapes can be recognized as forming a “Kette der Bildung” of 
the human species as a whole (FHA 1, 799). To the skeptic’s contention that this chain could 
not possibly reach beyond the first “Stammvater eines Landes” in various geographical areas, 
Herder responds: “I cannot see why it should only reach that far and not further, why these 
fathers of lands could not in turn have had among them a father of the earth, since ‘the whole 
continuing similarity of the household-economy of this species demands that this be so’” 
(Herder 2002, 156-157; FHA 1, 802). The requirement which, as Herder states here, emanates 
from a “fortgehende Ähnlichkeit der Haushaltung dieses Geschlechts” is crucial, because it is 
a precondition for identifying both differences and similarities between peoples, and of 
recognizing cultural transfer. In this way, Herder relies on analogy – i.e., on a certain degree 
of mirroring – to connect different human shapes in a Kette der Bildung. Thus Herder binds 
together Proteus’ different shapes into a world-historical development.  
In this argument, Proteus appears not to signify incommensurable difference, but rather 
‘dasselbe Lebendige’, the general unity which allows analogical understanding. By binding 
this Proteus, and aiming at a comparative synthesis of all the historical forms of human 
language, the secrets of the history of human language might be divined, including the forms 
of human life that language reflects (Spencer 2012, 78). The strength of this argument lies in 
its positive attribution of value to all of Proteus’ transformations. The only way to reach the 
universal, according to this construal, is via a collection of all particulars, and by appreciation 
of individualities as well as of analogies that, in a continuous chain, point at their connection. 
Furthermore, this role of Proteus in the philosophy of history Herder would later institute in 
work informed by a more explicitly worked out philosophy of nature, according to which all 
of nature is “formed according to one prototype and at the same time infinitely varied” (FHA 
6, 73; quoted in Nassar 2017, 116). The Hauptform and Haupttypus functioned as “a third, 
hidden and informing agent that was, in effect, the ground upon which all reality rested”, and 
guaranteed both the necessity and the efficacy of analogical inferences – in natural as much as 
in historical science (Reill 1996, 17-19; Nassar 2017, 116-117).  
However, it is important to recognize that Herder already practiced this form of 
understanding before he preached about the pantheistic unity of nature (mainly in God: Some 
Conversations and in the Ideas for the Philosophy of History of Humanity). Throughout This 
Too a Philosophy, for example, Herder’s conception of world history is infused with 
menschliche Kräfte, which connect seemingly disparate phenomena, and allow analogical 
understanding. Besides the Lebensalter of humanity, it is Proteus who personifies this 
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mediating force, and thus functions as the “concrete general” which embodies the whole of 
human history in the form of individuality (Heinz 1994, 83). The Proteus metaphor signifies 
the mutual reflection of the individual and totality, while none of their commonalities can be 
pinned down in abstraction. Instead, unifying notions must remain concrete and comparative 
images; they necessarily never exhaust the range of possible diversity, nor do they reduce the 
particulars to a (universal) generality. Such notions could be dubbed ‘Protean universals’. 
Furthermore, Proteus’ Homeric capacity of divination here receives a meaning previously 
analyzed by Peter Hanns Reill as particular to eighteenth-century natural history, but which 
was already explicit in early modern natural history as the dynamic between Proteus and Pan: 
grasping the unity of nature in its complexity by a constant dialectic between the individual 
and totality (Reill 1996, 17; Gjesdal 2017, 114). Thus upon the seizure of Proteus, his true 
identity becomes visible as this unity in diversity.  
Moreover, this argument is in keeping with one of the central uses of Proteus in a tradition 
which spans from “Pico’s use of him as a symbol for man’s enormous potentiality”, to 
Renaissance accounts of Proteus and Pan, all the way to Goethe’s use of Proteus in Faust, “as 
the vehicle for Homunculus in his quest for form and life” (Giamatti 1968, 443). That is, the 
potential to take on different shapes is itself the instance which gives form to all. Herder thus 
lends Leibniz’ principium individuationis a mythological shape, which transfers the problem 
of how to combine the greatest unity with the greatest diversity to the stage of the history of 
humanity.27 Its stable subject is the human being, or: ‘homo proteus’. 
Finally, the argument set out in this subsection explains why the skeptic is wrong: the 
diversity of human shapes should not be interpreted as material for Pyrrhonist arguments and 
as posing skeptical threats to feignedly static universals. Rather, it should be seen as 
constitutive to taking on human shape in the first place. Diversity hence does not principally 
threaten our capacity to recognize “our fellow brothers” – on the contrary, it first makes it 
possible (Herder 2002, 249; FHA 1, 150). According to Herder, the observations that inform 
argumentative modes of Pyrrhonism are resources for human self-understanding rather than 
philosophical scruples that together form a Gordian knot. So, Herder is able to deny the 
Pyrrhonist’s skeptical conclusions because Herder holds on to an identity underlying Proteus’ 
shape-shifting.  
Yet Herder’s argument also explains why ethnocentrism is wrong. For it elucidates why 
taking our own viewpoint to be universal is a false response to perceiving difference: it makes 
                                                 
27 This transfer was already analyzed in 1916 by Ernst Cassirer (1975, 115-121). 
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us blind to “the whole continuing similarity of the household-economy of this species” 
(Herder 2002, 156-157; FHA 1, 802). Thus, ethnocentrism blocks our recognition of the fact 
that history does not merely separate different nations, but also ties them together. It makes us 
mirror to ourself only one form of humanity, rather than letting us use our mirroring capacity 
to engage with new shapes and recognize them as human analogues. That is why Herder’s 
anti-skeptical argument is simultaneously anti-ethnocentric: the skeptic was misguided in 
assuming the necessity of static universals to begin with.28  
 
 
III.2 Genetic Explanation of Diversity 
 
The harmonious picture of Proteus does not exhaust Herder’s approaches to history. A central 
method of Herder in aesthetics, psychology, and philosophy of history, is to trace the genesis 
of concepts back to their origin – as far as possible, of course, and with shifting conceptions 
of the nature and attainability of origins. This genetic method is based on the assumption that, 
in the face of bewildering diversity and seeming chaos, understanding a thing’s development 
will help to make the proper distinctions and to avoid evaluating phenomena according to 
one-sided criteria (FHA 1, 601-603). Herder himself advocated this method by saying that 
since no two nations are the same, an extensive “Universalismus” is necessary to view and 
classify them all (HWP 1, 469; cf. Herz 1996, 179). Here I sketch the expectations connected 
by Herder to this “Entwicklungsgedanke” and explain how he intended to reconcile it with the 
individuality of human shapes (Meinecke 1946, 396). 
In his discussions of the potential of this method, especially when executed on the 
macroscopic level as a “Geschichte des menschlichen Verstandes”, Herder frequently refers to 
the “verschiednen Wanderungen und Verwandlungen” of the products of the human spirit, as 
well as to their Ovidian metamorphoses (FHA 1, 373, 601). The figure of Proteus in this 
context seems to refer mainly to chaos: 
 
The literature of foreign peoples and languages is often imported among other nations as a foreign colony; and 
because of this mixing together of ideas, of ethics, of manners of thinking and seeing, of languages, and of 
sciences, everything has necessarily had to take on such a different shape that literature seems to be a true 
Proteus when one pursues it through peoples and times and languages. Borrowed viewpoints got shifted to a new 
manner [of thinking and seeing], inherited truths got remolded to the point of unrecognizability, […]. (Herder 
2002, 50-51, translation modified; FHA 1, 559) 
 
                                                 
28 I explain in section III.3 why this symmetry between skepticism and ethnocentrism works the other way round 
as well.  
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This passage from the second edition of the first collection of Fragments deals with the close 
intertwinement of language and thought. Herder hence draws the corresponding conclusion 
concerning ideas and knowledge: “The three goddesses of human cognition – truth, beauty, 
and virtue – became as national as language was” (ibid. 50; 559). However, Herder did not go 
on to conclude from this that we should suspend judgment about truth, beauty, and virtue. 
Rather, their Protean character invites a more active response on the part of the knower: a 
chase through all different shapes, which should lead to an insight into the intelligible 
character of Proteus’ transformations. For a key aspect of Herder’s genetic method is to 
identify the causes which explain why “everything has necessarily had to take on such a 
different shape”. The necessity of change in this passage at the same time signifies its 
intelligibility. It should be possible to locate some fundamental principles which organize 
historical change, as well as world history at large (cf. Norton 1991, 72-75).29 That is, 
historical events can be traced back to “profound, universal causes” which, Herder states in a 
1773 essay, allow explanations of historical change to “be put to use at a later date” (Herder 
2006, 308; FHA 4, 112). 
In applying this method, one tendency in Herder’s writings is to suggest that disputes can 
be solved by causally explaining and disentangling apparently conflicting claims. Skeptical 
conclusions (drawn from unending dispute) are thus prevented by uncovering the actual 
plurality of criteria to which phenomena ought to be referred (FHA 1, 555-556; cf. also 181). 
In this context, Herder praises the ideal of a fully catalogued “encyclopedia and history of the 
sciences” in which “every field of wisdom shows itself in its own light, […] own color, own 
borders” (ibid., 556, my translation). Another, related tendency is to take the causal 
explanation of historical developments to a higher level, and establish general laws of 
historical change and metahistorical narratives. This was already the case in the Fragments’ 
theory of the life-stages of languages, where the sequence of stages has its own intelligibility 
(Irmscher 2009, 25-30). Herder defended this “comparison” against accusations of coming up 
with a “Roman” by stressing the inseparability of a phenomenon’s nature and its development 
(FHA 1, 600-601). In fact, Herder stated, many ethnocentric fallacies (listed above in section 
one) arise due to the hypostatizing of one particular shape of the phenomenon’s Protean 
                                                 
29 In this respect Herder did not fundamentally depart from the Enlightenment tradition of pragmatic history, but 
rather intended to take it to greater heights. Cf. Herder’s letter to Gatterer (Herder 1990, 2 / 1, 684-691), the 
Older Critical Grove (FHA 2, 11-15, 21-23) and the review of Schlözer (SWS 5, 439), and cf. accounts of 
Zammito 2002; Leventhal 1990; Norton 1991; Beiser 2011. 
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development (ibid., 602). Herder had already formulated the desideratum to block such 
fallacies via genetic explanation in 176430:  
 
Since my subject is constantly changing, I do not know where I shall find oneness; as often as I place the 
creature into the field of the magnifying glass, it appears in another shape. Should I take account of only one 
stage, my observations would doubtless be too fragmented and incomplete; should I take one after the other, but 
miss the first one, I would indeed miss the clew from which I may unravel those that follow. (Herder 1992, 79; 
HWP 1, 10) 
 
The Protean character of the subject matter demands of the knower an extra flexibility to 
chase historical change and bind the underlying subject. That is, since the magnifying glass 
does not on its own get hold of Proteus because of his shape-shifting, the knower must follow 
Proteus through all his different shapes – starting from the very first.  
Herder’s expectations regarding the positive outcome of insight into the causes of change 
were still higher in the Fourth Grove, On Riedel’s Theory of the Beaux Arts. There, Herder 
intended an analysis of the range of factors that make human judgments on matters of taste 
individual and context-dependent to prevent the skeptical conclusion “that there are no certain 
rules whatsoever relating to these qualities in the objects themselves […] that everything in 
Nature is a chaos of individual, disharmonious temperaments that cannot be accorded” 
(Herder 2006, 200; FHA 2, 283). For according to Herder’s method, what needs to be 
explained are the psychological, historical, geographical, and cultural causes of diversity. The 
aim of this method is to trace the shared core of basic human sensuousness, or the common 
principle of taste, which underlies all of its alterations. Admittedly, the Protean character of 
humanity makes it impossible to delineate concrete and stable features of such a core. Yet it is 
undeniably Herder’s aim to trace back all concepts to their origin: the human being and the 
“Analogie aller menschlichen Seelenkräfte” (Noyes 2015, 33-34; Sikka 2011, 21; Irmscher 
2009, 201; Herz 1996, 200-201, 211; Beiser 1987, 142-143).  
Homo proteus is a historical being, full of potential that can only take on specific shapes 
in particular historical contexts (Muthu 2003, 238). Hence even prominent features of 
Herder’s psychology, such as immediate feeling, unanalyzable sensuous concepts, and the 
human sensus communis are not themselves exempted from historical change (FHA 2, 280, 
284; Irmscher 2009, 148-149; Norton 1991, 50). However, I do not find an ironical dismissal 
of origins and unities in Herder’s texts (cf. Leventhal 1994, 150). Rather, Herder’s zeal to get 
                                                 
30 In fact the 1768 defense of the life-stages in the Fragments is a revision of the passage from the 1764 Essay on 
a History of Lyrical Poetry – yet Herder’s 1768 way of reformulating the passage in rhetorical questions 
obscures the point, and the self-reflexive character of his observation gets lost in the polemics against 
contemporaries. 
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at the origins of things, and to reveal the intelligibility of their development, is informed by 
the belief that it is principally possible to bind Proteus, and that in the chain of his 
transformations, the One is reflected.31 Herder makes this explicit in the conclusion of the 
same passage of the Fourth Grove: 
 
The Greek, the Gothic, the Moorish taste in architecture and sculpture, in mythology and poetry— is it the same? 
And is this taste not to be explained by the times, manners, and peoples? And does it not in each case have a first 
principle that has just not been understood well enough, just not felt with the same intensity, just not applied in 
the right proportion? And does not even this Proteus of taste, which transforms itself under every new sky, in 
every foreign clime wherein it draws breath, does not this diversity of taste itself prove, by the causes of its 
transformation, [beweiset er nicht selbst mit den Ursachen seiner Verwandlung] that beauty is one, just like 
perfection, just like truth? (Herder 2006, 202; FHA 2, 286) 
 
The context of this passage is very polemical (an attack on Justus Riedel’s conception of the 
“relative nature” of beauty) and the text is highly rhetorical (and was withheld by Herder from 
being published in a very late stage of its composition).32 However, of interest here is the 
suggestion that the causes of Proteus’ transformations prove that beauty is one. Herder’s point 
is that “the ground and order of everything” can be recognized as long as we take historical 
change as a natural phenomenon which can be made sense of in causal fashion (ibid., 199; 
282). Rather than treating change as a threat to the order of nature, the dynamic of the natural 
order adds to its splendor. For it is Proteus who himself proves “mit den Ursachen seiner 
Verwandlung” that there is one ideal of beauty. Some normative implications follow from 
this: Herder suggests in the same passage that we can recognize certain natural and cultural 
factors as ‘corrupting’ the level of a nation’s “Ästhetischen Bildung”; we can identify some 
phenomena that are considered beautiful everywhere around the globe; a basic universal 
psychological constitution underlies the diversity of human shapes; and principles can be 
distinguished according to which we can evaluate how well human beings are adapted to their 
(natural, historical) environment (FHA 2, 284-285; cf. Norton 1991, 165). By consequence, 
the genetic explanation of the diversity of taste has to rely on physiology, psychology and 
natural history as much as on philology.  
Furthermore, in this argument the Proteus of Bacon and Pico appears, who thought that 
the variety of Proteus’ shapes must be engaged exhaustively in order to learn about its 
                                                 
31 I take this analysis of the role of Proteus to be one way to go a bit further where Robert Norton’s very 
insightful interpretation of Herder stops: Herder did not only couple passionate empiricism with a belief in the 
power of origins; he also had metaphysical reasons why it would be possible to get close to a universal science 
of man, and approximate history in its totality (Norton 1991, 50, 156-157, 184). 
32 Herder stresses the diversity in taste in order to show that Riedel’s theory (of “fundamental feelings” for the 
true, good and beautiful) is unable to account for the phenomena. And he stresses the objectivity and ultimate 
unity of beauty in order to deny Riedel’s own skeptical conclusion. Herder’s conclusion then reverts to a 
universalistic ideal of a singular and “pure” beauty which is at odds with both earlier and later accounts (FHA 2, 
286-287). 
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essence, because all of nature (Pan) is Protean. The historian here also emulates Bacon’s ideal 
of natural science: to pursue Proteus through all his different shapes, because it is only in 
forcing nature to go through different passages that its true nature may be revealed (Burns 
2001, 973-974). The Protean character of truth, goodness, and beauty necessitates a historical 
approach to the study of man. This is because everything 
 
evolves from a single fundamental faculty of the soul to obtain ideas and in doing so, through this unfolding of 
its activity, to feel itself become ever more perfect and to take pleasure in doing so. How beautiful the human 
soul thereby becomes! Unity in its foundation, thousand-fold diversity in its development, perfection in the 
totality! (Herder 2006, 198; FHA 2, 280) 
 
Thus the human soul’s activity provides the origin of taste. Here we find the identity which, 
while it evades us at any particular moment in time, grounds the individuality of the human 
feeling of beauty.  
 
 
III.3. The Providential Bildung of Proteus 
 
In this final subsection I outline the additions and adjustments which Herder made to his 
Protean conception of humanity from a more affirmative religious perspective in his 1774 
This Too a Philosophy. His use of the Proteus metaphor in this text highlights the continuity 
of the anthropological presuppositions which inform Herder’s philosophy of history. But his 
references to the motif of a mirror now add a religiously inspired emphasis on the limitations 
to what is reflected to finite human beings. The text’s final motto encapsulates this emphasis 
in the phrase: “For now we see in a mirror, dimly, but then we will see face to face [...]” (1 
Cor 13:12; FHA 4, 107).33 This mirror may reflect images of divine revelation; but Herder 
now questions the adequacy and/or attainability of this reflecting. Herder’s references to a 
magic mirror are now balanced by the idea that human cognition relies on a dark mirror: the 
human soul at every single moment in time and space reflects only a fragment of creation 
(FHA 9 / 2, 86; cf. Herz 1996, 14-19). Nevertheless, I will show that this gives rise to a third 
strategy for reconciling change and continuity and for countering the Pyrrhonist tendency to 
infer skeptical conclusions from historical change. 
                                                 
33 I quote the New Revised Standard Version. In the Authorized Version it says “now we see through a glass, 
darkly” (Herder 2002, 358). Both a modern German version and the Luther Bible translate “ἐσόπτρου” as 
“Spiegel” (see Herz 1996, 16). 
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In Herder’s criticisms of the various ethnocentric universalizations of happiness and 
virtues, the familiar Protean model appears: 
 
Is not the good on the earth strewn about? Because one shape of humanity and one region of the earth could not 
grasp it, it got distributed into a thousand shapes, it roams forth [wandelt] – an eternal Proteus! – through all 
parts of the world and all centuries. Also, as he roams and roams further, it is not for greater virtue or happiness 
of the individual that he strives – humanity ever remains only humanity – and yet a plan of striving further 
becomes visible – my great theme! (Herder 2002, 298, translation modified; FHA 4, 40) 
 
Herder pitches a Protean transforming and striving forth (wandeln) of humanity against both 
the skeptics and the Enlightenment universalists. He explicitly positions himself between 
these two positions, which could for example be identified with the works of Jacques-Bénigne 
Bossuet and Voltaire.34 Bossuet’s universal history represented the naïve faith in the linear 
and providential progress of a universal morality. Voltaire attempted to present a universal 
history of human virtues and vices on the basis of the progression of a universal and natural 
human rationality – but announced chaos and catastrophe when diving into the actual events 
of history (Kondylis 1981, 444-451). Voltaire’s observation of human passion and folly lead 
to skepticism about all morality and philosophy, Herder contends (FHA 4, 41, 104). For 
Herder, the positions of Bossuet and Voltaire are two sides of the same coin: the search for a 
straight line of progress in history leads to catastrophe theory.35 The projection of ideals onto 
history that are too general and abstract necessarily leads to disillusionment about the 
meaning of history. This is why Herder’s anti-skepticism is not, as Sikka suggests, less 
predominant than his anti-ethnocentrism. Herder considers the skeptical philosophes in Paris 
and the optimistic German and Swiss Aufklärer united by sharing the same mistaken 
assumptions. I will now elucidate why Herder thinks they are wrong in the way they approach 
both Proteus and the mirroring quality of creation, before I present Herder’s alternative 
approach. 
Herder accuses his contemporaries of having presented their own shape of humanity as a 
new divinity, allegedly capable of the absolute freedom of taking on any shape at will. Herder 
considers this blasphemous, and he portrays his contemporaries like fraudulent alchemists 
who manipulate human nature according to their own self-indulgent ideals (ibid., 83-84). He 
formulates the danger residing in this perverse misinterpretation of the human condition in 
                                                 
34 Frederick Beiser is right that Herder’s critique was leveled at work of many of his contemporaries, not just two 
specific authors (Beiser 2011, 133). But it is nonetheless relevant to concretely identify the two groups of 
opponents at which Herder directed his criticisms. 
35 This “double polemic” has been identified before by Kondylis and Beiser (Kondylis 2002, 635; Beiser 1992, 
208). This is in line with Herder’s general polemic against metaphysicians and skeptics, and supported by the 
text’s motto, taken from Epictetus: “It is not things that disquiet human beings but dogmas concerning things” 
(Herder 2002, 272; FHA 4, 9). 
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terms familiar from Pico: “[T]he philosopher is most an animal when he would wish to be 
most reliably a God” (Herder 2002, 334; FHA 4, 81). The philosophers Herder has in mind 
attempt to present a particular shape of Proteus as if it were a general form, which would be 
exactly contrary to Proteus’ nature. In more recent terms, their gesture is to cast homo proteus 
as a super-human, or: as homo deus (cf. Harari 2016). What’s more, the philosopher’s ideal of 
a completely general and pure humanity or reason serves other interests, which Herder 
ironically describes as another divinity, namely pecunia personified: “How we know to seize 
the single god of all gods, Mammon, as a second Proteus!, and how to change him!, and how 
to extort everything from him that ever we want!” (Herder 2002, 326; FHA 4, 71-72). Those 
who chase this Proteus do not respect his or their integrity. Rather, they torture and plunder 
under the false assumption that they hear Proteus divine, and present themselves as the 
“mirror of all the past and representative of the purpose of the composition in all its scenes! 
The precocious child slanders and blasphemes” (ibid., 336; 84). 
Herder’s alternative Protean conception of humanity aligns mutability with finitude, and 
with the destiny which human beings help fulfill as a tiny element of historical development. 
The way Herder relies on Proteus’ identity here is consistent with his earlier works in insisting 
that “human being always remains human being, in accordance with the analogy of all things 
nothing but human being!”, and that “inside beneath the manyfold transformed husk the same 
kernel of essential nature and of capacity for happiness can still be preserved” (ibid., 334-
335; 81-82). This organic core is “invisible”, and “differently developed, indeed appears in 
different forms, but inwardly only one measure and mixture of forces” (ibid.). Its 
development, however, proceeds according to intentions which, from “the right viewpoint”, 
could be intimated (ibid., 335; 82). Although God’s intentions mostly lie beyond the 
historian’s grasp, the notion of a providential formation of humanity should capture both the 
conviction that all of history is meaningfully interconnected and in development, and that 
there is no uniform set of standards along which this development can be measured (SWS 5, 
589). In fact, it is crucial to Herder’s position that God’s plan is mostly unknown to us. 
Herder’s philosophy of history is teleological, but it is so in an “open” manner (cf. Spencer 
2012, 118, 122; Sikka 2011, 118-121). Herder does not subsume historical periods as means 
to a fixed and final end: the conditions that endow certain periods with value change as well 
(FHA 4, 54, 87). Furthermore, out of our lack of insight into providence a further key feature 
can be explained, which would later be known as the “cunning of reason” (Hegel), or 
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“heterogony of ends” (Wundt).36 The crucial feature of any successful theodicy is that it 
manages to interpret the appearance of evil in the world as contributing to the good despite 
itself (cf. ibid., 53-54, 83, 98). The indiscernibility of God’s ways has stood the test of time as 
a method for achieving this. 
The religious acceptance of human finitude – and the trust in the way God has tied all of 
history together – provides a distinct perspective on the reconciliation of human diversity and 
unity. In contrast to the Treatise’s “progressive unity of all conditions of life”, achieved 
through human reflection, Herder’s 1774 picture of world history introduces a faith in fate 
that is crucial especially in those instances where the turns of history appear arbitrary and 
even cruel (Herder 2002, 155; FHA 1, 800). The chain which links together the many phases 
of Proteus’ Bildung depends on a divine instance in which finite creatures should put their 
trust and hope.37 However, this perspective is not systematically at odds with the strategies 
lined out in the previous subsections. It is still a manner to accept situatedness, to bypass the 
Pyrrhonist argumentative modes by pluralizing value-terms, and to grasp the intelligible order 
of this plurality as well as of every single of its individual elements. According to this larger 
vision, Herder allows the historian to assert or recognize the value of each of Proteus’ 
individual shapes, as well as the contribution that these forms make to one large world-
historical development.  
The identity which underlies Proteus’ changes is the concept of ‘humanity’, and the 
providential development of its Bildung is its telos. Thus Herder finishes an early introduction 
to This Too a Philosophy: “I would only wish for myself as guide and Muse of my 
observations that genius who was the genius of the human species in all its conditions and 
invisibly guided, still guides, and alone completely surveys the thread of the development of 
its forces and inclinations” (Herder 2002, 271; SWS 5, 589-590). Essential to this conception 
of unity in diversity is the notion of world history in its totality. Next to the transcendence of 
the divine perspective, this totality receives a normative function which is immanent in 
history, yet transcends any particular historical inquiry. This totality is an infinite task and an 
object of faith, but it is Herder’s way of holding on to the value of any and all particular.  
Furthermore, the analogies and harmonies that we are able to recognize from our finite 
perspective (as discussed above); the attempts to explain historical change; and recognizing 
                                                 
36 Kondylis has analyzed the history of this strategy in Enlightenment philosophy of history (Kondylis 2002, 
433, 467-468).  
37 Yet the argument from finitude was not absent from the earlier texts either. In the Fragments, for example, 
Herder distinguished between human language and divine thought, and concluded that language was a Proteus 
on earth (FHA 1, 557-559). 
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different forms of the good as good all do help to intimate world history in its totality. At least 
it is Herder’s attempt to reveal the meaning of the Bildung of humanity: “‘God’s course 
through the nations! Spirit of the laws, ages, ethics, and arts – how they have followed!, 
prepared!, developed, and displaced! one another.’ If only we had such a mirror of the human 
species in all faithfulness, fullness, and feeling of God’s revelation” (Herder 2002, 340; FHA 
4, 88). Herder’s 1774 philosophy of history thus attempts to synthesize the particulars of 
world history into a mirror. It should show how the human species’ course through history 
everywhere reflects the human spirit in different shapes. It is now an issue of religious 
intimation whether it is possible to find the right viewpoint for attaining such a reflection of 
humanity. Still, already in 1766, Herder had demanded such a mirror for the purpose of 
recognizing the same humanity beneath diverse shapes. In 1774 as in 1766 Proteus appears as 
a symbol of the synthesis of radical difference and unity and as an alternative both to forms of 
skepticism and of abstract universalism. Moreover, the structural relation between Proteus’ 
shape-changing and his power of divination is remarkably similar and allows for harmony 
through analogy in much the same way as exhibited in the Treatise on the Origin: 
 
Great must be the whole where already in every individuality there appears such a whole!, but in every 
individuality there also still only reveals itself such an indeterminate One, solely for the whole! Where little 
connections already yield great meaning, and yet centuries are only syllables, nations only letters and perhaps 
interpunctuations, which mean nothing in themselves but so much for the easier meaning of the whole! (Ibid., 
356-357; 105-106) 
 
 
IV Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have distinguished three strategies all referring to the figure of Proteus and 
adopted by Herder to argue for a unity in diversity. Contrary to what is often suggested in 
Herder scholarship, the three strategies have in common that Proteus does not merely signify 
instability, untruthfulness, chaos or the violation of the order of things. Quite the opposite: in 
Herder’s philosophy of history, Protean mutability is an essential aspect of the natural-
historical order. What’s more, in this dynamic order, many of the positive connotations 
traditionally attached to Proteus are expressed. Thus the Homeric connotation of a capacity to 
divine to the knower who manages to bind Proteus about the true nature of things is explicit in 
Herder’s use of the metaphor. And the humanist conception of an essential mutability of 
human nature and the responsibility to cultivate (bilden) humanity in the right way are also 
inherent in Herder’s Protean conception of humanity. Furthermore, the Baconian activity on 
the part of the knower in chasing Proteus through all different shapes and the intimate 
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connection between Proteus and Pan (nature, All) both play crucial roles in Herder’s aim to 
approach world history as a harmonious totality. This totality, which can only be found in all 
of Proteus’ different shapes, was expressed already in the late-ancient Orphic Hymns to which 
Hamann had referred in his Clouds: “He has all at his disposal,/ transformed far beyond/ all 
other immortals/ […] for Physis was the first to place everything in Proteus” (Athanassakis, 
Wolkow 2013, 23). 
However, the three discussed strategies are also distinct: the 1774 providential model of 
This Too a Philosophy (strategy three) focuses more on the finitude of individual human 
beings than the 1769 Treatise on the Origin (strategy one) in order to arrive at a conception of 
the history of humanity as interconnected in a great chain of Bildung. And the causal-genetic 
pursuit of Proteus’ different shapes (strategy two) tends to block skepticism in a manner 
distinct from the picture of harmonious unity suggested in both strategies one and three. For 
the pursuit of Proteus’ changes strives towards either an absolute origin or core, or to multiple 
individual fields or forms, rather than towards analogical connections. Nonetheless, I consider 
both their procedure (recognizing analogies) as well as their result (a world-historical “Kette 
der Bildung”) unite strategies one and three. Moreover, both the results of causal-genetic 
explanation (individualities as well as the Origin/One) would themselves again be candidates 
for the procedure of forming connections on the basis of recognized analogies. 
Finally, I have argued in this paper that all three strategies are part of the same effort of 
Herder to deny that any skeptical conclusions can be drawn from the phenomena of natural 
and historical diversity. Herder’s (ontological and theological) trust in the ultimate unity of all 
of Proteus’ forms facilitates the engagement of their diversity. It must hence be concluded that 
Proteus appears as an anti-skeptical device in Herder’s texts rather than as an emblem of mere 
flux and difference. Contrary to the Pyrrhonist mode of taking difference as signaling the need 
to suspend judgment, Herder takes the diversity of Proteus’ shapes as an invitation to collect, 
order and evaluate them all. The ontological trust underlying Herder’s approach to diversity 
may not satisfy the modern reader who expects a more technical and charitable engagement 
with skeptical challenges. Yet it does make Proteus into a figure signifying in Herder’s 
writings an anti-skeptical as much as an anti-ethnocentric program: it proves human diversity 
to be constitutive to any general anthropology and explains why universalizing our own 
standpoint is a non-starter in the field of human history. 
This brings me to the conclusion that a coherent philosophy of history can be found 
scattered throughout the early works of Herder. That is to say: to rely on analogies in the 
search of differences and larger harmonies; to trace the causes of change in order to improve 
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the understanding of diversity; to hold on to very broad notions of stable truth, goodness, 
beauty and humanity; and to combine these with a religious intimation of the providential 
development of humanity are efforts that can be made into a consistent philosophy of history. 
In fact, Herder’s treatment of happiness and virtue in This Too a Philosophy hint at ways of 
reconciling the claims that we only have access to Proteus’ particular shapes, and that we 
nonetheless should hold on to a notion of the good that is stable and yet “verteilt in tausend 
Gestalten” (FHA 4, 40). However, it has been observed before that it is difficult to recognize 
such a consistent philosophy of history in the 1774 treatise. Rather, this text contains a partial 
sketch of how an account of world history could look as a meaningful development in which 
each phase expresses the good in a particular form. Hence the conclusion of this study of the 
Proteus figure in Herder’s early writings is a different one.  
I hope to have shown in this paper that Herder’s repeated invocation of the mythological 
figure of Proteus expresses the continuous effort of thinking through (in both a more radical 
and constructive way than his predecessors) the implications of historical change. My analysis 
has displayed that in order to achieve this, and to make historical diversity potent for a 
positive anthropology, Herder relies on myth, metaphysics, and theology. Herder’s use of 
metaphors like the one discussed here shows the influence of mythological thinking on 
systematic issues even in those texts like the Fourth Grove and On the Change of Taste, 
which in other respects come closest to a “thoroughgoing naturalism” on Herder’s part 
(Zammito 2016, 21). Hence it is essential that interpretation of Herder’s anthropology does 
not present seemingly incommensurable fields in “a blunt either / or” manner, but indeed 
attempts to “think them together” (ibid., 21-22). Attending to the context of these metaphors, 
and working out the different conceptual possibilities they open, helps to explain how Herder 
integrated the results of thoroughgoing historical and natural science into a theology of 
humanity. 
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